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Abstract 
 
The eurozone faces a profound sovereign debt crisis threatening the very 
existence of the euro. As a result, the recovery of the world economy has 
become more uncertain. Therefore, the study of the foundations of this 
crisis is of the utmost importance. Three of the countries involved, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain, share some important attributes: they are all 
recent democracies and comparatively less developed economies in the 
set of the twelve initial member States of the eurozone. For these three 
countries this paper shows that the behavior of the political variables 
emphasized by the literature as determining the performance of fiscal 
variables, is indeed statistically different from the ones observed for the 
other countries in difficulties, Ireland and Italy, which are mature 
democracies and comparatively developed economies. These outcomes 
are in line with what the relevant literature expects from countries with 
those characteristics, such as election year budget cycles. Besides, post-
election year budget effects were also detected implying no fiscal 
consolidation.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 The eurozone is going through extremely difficult times 
threatening its very existence, at least in its present configuration. Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal have already been intervened by the so-called 
troika: the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions 
agreed to provide financial assistance to those three countries in exchange 
for substantial general government expenditure cuts and increased 
revenues, taxes and otherwise, in order to reduce budget deficits and 
public debt to sustainable levels in a short period of time, as well as 
profound structural reforms. In the meantime, from the very beginning of 
this crisis, financial markets have shown persistent doubts about the 
ability of Spain to fulfill its obligations towards its creditors without a 
similar intervention. As a result, the previous and the present Spanish 
governments were required to adopt significant austerity measures of the 
kind pursued by the peripheral countries. More recently, the same doubts 
began afflicting Italy, forcing a government change to a more 
technocratic-oriented one, as had been the case in Greece a short while 
ago. 
With the exception of Ireland, whose crisis has its roots in the 
banking sector, those are all southern European countries. In addition, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS) have at least two other characteristics 
in common when compared to the remaining nine founding eurozone 
3 
 
member states: a) they are recent democracies and, b) within the 
eurozone, they are relatively less developed countries.  
These three countries restored democracy almost at the same time. 
In Portugal and Greece, the dictatorships in power collapsed in 1974; in 
Spain, the death of Franco in 1975 opened way to democracy under the 
leadership of the newly installed king. GDP per capita is an indicator of 
economic development. The average GDP per capita in PPS for each 
country in the period 1995-2010 expressed in index numbers, where 100 
is the base year value for the whole set of the 27 EU countries, is shown 
in Table 1. In the framework of the eurozone these numbers corroborate 
that the GPS set is a comparatively backward one. In fact, among the 
initial twelve member States of the eurozone the GPS countries are the 
only ones with GDP per capita bellow the EU 27 average.  
To the economic literature, governments’ actual management of 
public finances is the outcome of a political game played by politicians 
and voters by means of which both aim at improving their own welfare 
levels. However, the particular explanatory factors considered by that 
literature’s abundant theoretical and empirical contributions fall under 
many and diverse categories. Just for illustrative purposes, one can 
mention the role played by pressure groups (Olson, 1965); the ideological 
orientation of the political parties in power (Hibbs, 1977); institutional 
variables like the form of government as set by constitutional rules 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002, 2003); the political  level of fragmentation; 
and, just to finish, the influence of political budget cycles (PBC). The 
political budget cycle approach emphasizes several variables among 
which the country’s degree of economic development and the overall 
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quality of its democracy, the latter in connection to the transparency of 
the whole budgetary process. This latter factor includes the ability of 
voters to access and decode economic and political information which 
restricts the capability of policy makers to manipulate fiscal variables for 
electoral purposes. 
Based on panel data estimation techniques, and bearing in mind 
the coincidences mentioned above, we test the hypothesis that the present 
fiscal problems of Greece, Portugal, and Spain are explained by 
significantly different behavioral patterns of relevant political and 
institutional variables in comparison to the other more developed and 
politically mature founding eurozone member states, including Ireland 
and Italy. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the 
underlying literature; section 3 describes the model to be tested and the 
data set used; section 4 presents and discusses the estimated results. 
Finally, section 5 draws some final conclusions.  
 
 
2. The Budget as a Political Game 
 
Following the tradition of the public choice literature on the 
median voter model and on pressure groups (Olson, 1965; Becker, 1983; 
Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Becker and Mulligan, 1999; Lott and Kenny, 
1999), we take as explanatory variables the fraction of the elderly 
population, and labor union density. According to the arguments by 
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Meltzer and Richard (1981) regarding the statistical distribution of 
income,1 we expect these population groups to favor income 
redistribution in their favor, vote on political parties that respond 
positively to their preferences and, in the process, lead to a deterioration 
of the fiscal budget unless higher enough taxes are levied on other 
population groups.  
This matter is closely related to the so-called partisan approach 
model first introduced by Hibbs (1977). He stresses the ideological bias 
of political parties and governments. The central idea is that they serve 
the ideological and economic preferences of their constituencies. 
Accordingly, one has to distinguish political parties and the governments 
they support along a spectrum going from the extreme left to the extreme 
right. On a permanent and long lasting basis, left wing parties and the 
governments they support are supposed to favor income redistribution and 
low unemployment, whereas right wing governments are expected to put 
greater emphasis on economic efficiency and low inflation. That is, in the 
first case we would expect higher expenditures than in the later and, 
consequently, a bias towards fiscal deficits. However, the usefulness of 
this approach requires political parties whose programmes and practices 
follow the usual ideological tenets, instead of converging to the center of 
the political spectrum. 
Political fragmentation is a variable much emphasized by a certain 
brand in the literature (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Kontopoulos and 
Perotti, 1999; Hallerberg et al., 2007). Political fragmentation comes in 
                                           
1
 It is positively skewed. Therefore, average income is higher than median 
income. 
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two interpretations: a) the legislative, meaning the number of parties 
forming the government and support in the legislative assembly and, b) 
the executive, meaning the number of spending ministers. In general, the 
economic literature assumes that the higher political fragmentation is, the 
weaker the government. The expected outcomes are higher expenditures, 
lower revenues, and higher fiscal deficits owing to the government’s 
inability to resist competing groups pressing for budgetary benefits. 
Under this perspective, the budgetary process truly becomes a common 
good with asymmetrically distributed benefits and costs among the 
members of the community. Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b) provide 
empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis; however, Edin and 
Ohlsson (1991) and Haan and Sturm (1994) dispute those finds on several 
grounds, be they the conceptual inappropriateness of the political 
cohesion variable used or measurement errors in its construction. In fact, 
there is abundant historical evidence showing that coalition governments, 
and even caretaker2 or non-party governments, are often empowered to 
provide countries the political strength required to solve the utmost severe 
problems; therefore they are not necessarily synonymous with weak 
governments. 
On the assumption of downward sloping Phillips curves, Nordhaus 
(1975) and Lindbeck (1976) were the first to reflect on the economic 
effects of elections, giving rise to the so-called opportunistic view. 
According to this view, incumbents try to stimulate economic growth and 
reduce unemployment in election years at the expense of more inflation, 
so to boost their probabilities of re-election, hence producing political 
                                           
2
 Such is the case with the present Greek government led by Mr. Lucas 
Papademos. 
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business cycles (PBC). Given that this approach lacked empirical and 
theoretical support (Alesina and Roubini, 1992), it was later modified by 
the contributions of various authors among whom Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), Rogoff (1990), Persson and Tabellini (1990, 2002), Lohmann 
(1998), and Shi and Svensson (2006) into what is currently known as 
political budget cycles. That is, with the same opportunistic goal in sight 
politicians manipulate the level of fiscal variables directly under their 
control, like expenditures, revenues and the budget balance, before and 
eventually after elections. Hence, countries would be face with 
expansionary fiscal pre-election cycles and contractionary post-election 
cycles with the later intended to correct for the distortions arising from 
the former. Manipulation of the composition of revenues and 
expenditures, rather than their total levels, is another possibility predicted 
by this literature (Rogoff, 1990). Following this hypothesis, incumbents 
would prefer to allocate extra funds to visible expenditures in detriment of 
less visible ones, for instance, more social transfers and other current 
expenditures, but less investment (Franzese, 2002; Drazen and Eslava, 
2005, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 2006a, 2006b).  
Lidbom (2003, p.1) aptly summarizes the implications of political 
budget cycles in the following points: a) spending is raised and taxes are 
cut in election years; b) in those years spending is higher for incumbents 
that are re-elected in comparison to those that fail re-election. However, 
the capability to pursue political fiscal cycles in levels might be 
constrained by institutional factors imposing some degree of discipline on 
public finances, like the value of the deficit and of debt as a proportion of 
GDP, such being the case in the eurozone. The empirical literature on this 
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hypothesis is rather inconclusive since while some authors find evidence 
in support of political budget cycles whatever the degree of economic 
development, others do not (Schneider, 2010, p.128). 
The above mentioned more sophisticated approaches are adverse 
selection and moral hazard-based models focusing on three main 
elements: a) the signaling of competence by politicians to voters; b) 
rational expectations formation by voters coupled with incomplete 
information; c) strategic behavior on the part of both politicians and 
voters. The assumption of incomplete information relates to voters’ and 
politicians’ ignorance of politicians’ actual competence levels,3 as well as 
to the hidden efforts they undertake. These efforts, leading to lower taxes, 
higher expenditures and deficits, or to the re-composition of expenditures, 
are observable by the public only with a delay, and serve to distort voters’ 
perception of politicians’ competence favoring their odds of re-election. 
Therefore, the transparency of the budgetary process is a central element 
to the theory. The ability of the public to access and understand 
information on the budget in due time is therefore crucial to reduce the 
occurrence of political budget cycles, and might be impaired in a variety 
of ways. The intrinsic opaqueness of the whole set of rules on how 
budgets are prepared, approved and executed is one such way. Another 
likely way are all sorts of barriers that the public has to overcome to 
access existing information; for example, no full access to the media 
owing to economic, legal or other types of constraints, or then 
information itself is intentionally distorted. The experience of the public 
with the workings of a democracy might as well be an important factor 
                                           
3
 Rogoff (1990) assumes politicians do in fact know their own competence, 
whereas Shi and Svensson (2002) assume otherwise. 
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determining the transparency of the whole budgetary process in the sense 
that the more experienced they are, the more difficult it is for politicians 
to hide and distort relevant information on the eve of elections (Brender 
and Drazen, 2003, 2005, 2007). Transparency considerations have thus 
led the literature to reflect on the impact of recent versus mature 
democracies on the incidence of political budget cycles, and the 
hypothesis tested is that in non-mature democracies, like the GPS set, 
transparency is inherently lower and, therefore, those countries are more 
exposed to political budget cycles (Gonzalez, 2002). In particular, 
Brender and Drazen (2003, 2005) conclude that the political budget 
cycles found by the empirical literature among developed and less 
developed countries are due to samples that include both mature and non-
mature democracies because that is a specific occurrence of new 
democracies. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) also find strong 
evidence in support of sizable and short-lived4 political budget cycles in 
the case of Russia, and confirm the hypothesis that their magnitudes 
decrease with democracy, transparency, media freedom and voter 
awareness.5 
On the other hand Besley and Chase (1995) and Banks and 
Sundaram (1998) developed agency models that can be extended to 
                                           
4
 This evidence supports third generation PBC models since sudden and short-
lived expansions in the election year financed by government borrowing is more easily 
hidden from voters that it can be if undertaken in previous years and lasting for relatively 
long periods. 
5
 For these authors the weak evidence on political budget cycles shown by other 
studies is explained by low frequency data (because pre and post-election cycles with 
different signs cancel-up in low frequency data). Sizable shifts in spending happen 
within a month or two of elections. They consider education and urbanization, besides 
indices of government transparency, media freedom and democracy (Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2004, p.1305).   
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politicians’ behavior and political budget cycles. The assumed politician 
goal is now the maximization of rent seeking, such that good politicians 
are less rent-seeking than bad ones. In fact, pre-announced election 
timetables held at regular time intervals serve to reduce rent-seeking 
incentives. In contrast to Rogoff (1990)’ model, bad politicians induce 
higher public expenditures than good politicians do. The predictions 
following from these agency models are (Lidbom, 2003, p.7): a) in 
election years politicians that raise spending and taxes are not re-elected 
because voters perceive those actions as increased rent extraction; b) after 
the election, re-elected politicians look for less rent extraction than newly 
elected officials since, on average, they are better-off and, as a 
consequence, spending and taxation are lower in the event of a re-
election; c) in case of a re-election, spending and taxation are higher after 
the election relative to pre-election levels. However, this and the previous 
approaches are related in the sense that the lower the degree of democracy 
the higher the level of rent extraction by politicians to generate public 
support and the lower the level of public goods provision, and vice-versa 
since then rents become politically more expensive (Hausken et al., 
2004). 
In spite of its intuition, the degree of social inequality is rarely 
taken into account by the empirical literature dealing with the behavior of 
fiscal variables. To the best of our knowledge, Woo (2003) and Berg and 
Sachs (1988) are the few examples available. The theoretical foundations 
on this functional relationship are not well established (Woo, 2003, p. 
402), and yet Woo assumes that higher Gini coefficients lead to higher 
deficits on the assumption of underlying incentives to populist policies of 
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income redistribution. Indeed, the sign he expects a priori is debatable 
because high social polarization denotes low-income redistribution, 
therefore lower taxation and social transfers than would be required to 
achieve less social polarization. We include this variable in our model, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, and expect a negative relationship with 
fiscal revenues and expenditures whereas the impact upon the budget 
balance is uncertain a priori.  
The population’s level of education is a variable whose inclusion 
in this model can be justified on several grounds. Firstly, it can be 
understood as a proxy for the transparency of the budgetary process; 
however, since electors from non-mature democracies are by definition 
less experienced, the inclusion of education with this purpose would be 
incongruous. In the case of the GPS we can assume that the higher the 
education of their voters the more they are aware of their lower standards 
of living in comparison to the older democracies and more developed 
countries they have become associated with. Accordingly, we expect 
them to show a strong tendency to emulate those consumption models by 
means of a fast catching-up process, which puts high pressure on 
politicians and on public finances. On more stable scenarios the influence 
played by education might follow quite a different direction. In general, 
we expect a positive association between people’s income and education, 
the implications being at least two: a) lower tax rates needed for the 
Government to collect the planned fiscal revenues, thus explaining why 
some literature refers to developed countries’ voters as fiscal 
conservatives and, for the very same reason, b) lower contributions to 
social security. 
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3. Model and Data Set 
 
A panel data approach, controlling for countries’ and time fixed 
effects,6 is used to estimate the model and the underlying hypothesis. The 
model subject to testing is written as: 
 
, =  +  + 	 + 
, +  
, + 
, + 
, +
            +
, + 
, + 
, + 
 , + !", +
           + #,                                                                                               (1)
             
where , is a fiscal dependent variable in country $ in year %. The 
selected dependent variables are total expenditures, social security 
outlays, total tax revenues and the budget surplus all in proportion to 
GDP. All these four variables are general government’s. Total tax 
revenues evaluated in this manner turn out to be the effective average tax 
rate. , stands for trade union density measured as net union 
membership as a fraction of wage and salary earners. , is the 
proportion of the country’s total population aged at least 65 years old. 
, captures the ideological composition of the cabinet, and assumes 
the values (1) for hegemony of right-wing parties, (2) for dominance of 
right-wing and centre parties, (3) for balance of power between 
right/centre and left parties, (4) for dominance of social democratic and 
                                           
6
 Since the data set includes all the countries, it seems to be preferable to 
employ the fixed effects estimation. Besides, Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) indicates 
that fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects model. 
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other left parties, (5) for hegemony of social democratic and other left 
wing parties. , stands for the level of legislative fragmentation; it 
takes (1) for single party majority governments, (2) for minimal winning 
coalitions, (3) for surplus coalitions, (4) for single party minority 
governments; (5) for multi party minority governments; (6) for caretaker 
and non-party governments; (7) other. , is the analogous measure of 
income distribution and social cohesion, taking values in the closed 
interval [0,1]. , is the level of secondary education which 
increases with the values taken by that variable, measured as the 
percentage of the population that finished secondary school. To capture 
the effect of elections on the selected fiscal variables we include an 
indicator for election year, ,, computed according to the formula 
proposed by Franzese (2000): 
 
 , =  &'()*+
,-    $. /. 0102%$3. 40/50   $. /11 3%ℎ05 40/58       9                                 (2) 
 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election, and D is 
the number of days in that month. The value of , increases as the 
date of the election approaches the end of the year, taking into account the 
timing of an election. , = ,+ stands for the year 
immediately following those where elections took place, its rationale 
being the detection of political budget counter-cycles intended to correct 
fiscal decisions taken in election years. ", is a vector of control 
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variables: the unemployment rate , ,7  the degree of openness of the 
economy ,  and the one period lagged general government stock 
of debt in proportion of GDP :;,) .  is country $’s fixed effect, 
	 is period t’s fixed effect, and #, is a white noise term.  
In order to differentiate between mature and recent democracies, 
this being the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS), with respect to 
testing electoral and post-electoral political budget cycles, the countries’ 
sample was also divided by means of a multiplicative dummy taking the 
value of one for GPS, and zero for non-GPS. Then, to differentiate the 
effects in the five states presently in difficulties, we introduce a 
multiplicative dummy variable, ,, taking the value of one for 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Span, and zero for the remaining 
countries. Finally, we excluded the GPS from the sample and re-estimated 
the model for the remaining nine member states, with a multiplicative 
dummy variable, ,,  taking the value of one for Italy and Ireland, and 
zero for the other countries; our purpose being in this case to test the 
hypothesis that the performance of these developed and mature 
democracies did not differ significantly from the other seven member 
states with those same characteristics. 
Except for the fiscal variables, data was collected from 
Comparative Political Data Set I (Armigeon et al., 2010), which is a 
                                           
7
 The output gap is an alternative to the unemployment rate. However, the 
unemployment rate is more objective in its quantification, available to the public in 
general on a monthly basis, well understood by everybody and waited by the markets as 
a good indicator of the state of the economy. Besides, since it directly affects the well-
being of the electors and their opinions on the government, politicians feel obliged to 
respond to it by means of appropriate discretionary fiscal policies (Fernandes and Mota, 
2011). 
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collection of political, institutional, demographic, social and economic 
annual data for currently democratic countries covering the period from 
1960 to 2008. Data for general government’s total expenditures, fiscal 
revenues, social security transfers and the budget surplus are from OECD 
Economic Outlook Statistics and Projections. 
The model was estimated for the period 1976-2008 (32 years of 
observations), and just taking into account the 11 founding eurozone 
member States8 plus Greece that adopted the Euro in 2001.  The choice of 
the initial year is explained by the fact that by then all those countries had 
become democracies. Also, the panel is unbalanced due to missing 
observations. 
The summary descriptive statistics by variable and by country are in 
Table 2. The time evolution of the fiscal variables and its average values 
by country are displayed in Figures 2-5. 
 
 
4. The Estimated Results 
 
Tables 3 through 7 report the estimated results. We have first 
estimated the base line model consisting of the set of the 11 initial 
eurozone members plus Greece. Then we carried on with our estimates, 
firstly introducing dummies for the GPS countries, followed by the 
addition of Italy and Ireland. Finally, we excluded the GPS from the 
                                           
8
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
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sample and re-estimated the model for the remaining nine member states, 
with dummies for Italy and Ireland.  
In all cases the model has high explanatory power as shown by the 
computed adjusted R2, and provides strong and enlightening results.  
Beginning with the results relative to general government 
expenditures (see Table 3), when we take the base line model we detect 
no election or post-election year budget cycles; education and the 
governments’ ideology are not statistically significant either, but the 
coefficients on union density and elderly population are positive and 
significant, whereas legislative fragmentation and the  coefficient 
are equally significant but negative instead. Except for legislative 
fragmentation, all signs are as expected. Indeed, legislative fragmentation 
exerts a tightening effect upon expenditures. In our opinion, the rationale 
for this latter result is to be found on the strong institutional external 
constraints subjecting these countries before and after the introduction of 
the euro arising from both the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This conviction is supported by the mode of its distribution 
for the period being tested; it bears out that for the most part the 
preparation and actual management of the new currency regime was not 
the responsibility of single party majority governments. On the other 
hand, the estimated coefficients on the control variables unemployment 
rate and one period lagged debt uncovers anti-cyclical expenditure 
policies coupled with a slight effort on debt control. 
Once we divide the sample between GPS and non-GPS we detect 
some striking differences of regime. For the GPS set governments’ 
ideology and fragmentation, as well as education and election year budget 
17 
 
cycles all significantly differ from the same variables estimated 
coefficients for the other nine countries. While government ideology 
plays a restraining role among the latter, it is just the reverse among the 
GPS and the mode of the distribution shows that, except for Portugal, 
there prevailed social democratic and other left parties; in fact, these 
results confirm the role that the literature has come to expect from 
ideologies in the management of public expenditures. And now, even 
though legislative fragmentation continues to have a tightening impact 
upon the explained variable, it is much weaker than the one applying to 
non-GPS, just −0.09, that is, it sounds as if among the GPS the external 
institutional constraints associated with the adoption of the euro were less 
strictly applied. Compared to non-GPS countries, GPS exhibit a lower 
level of experience with coalition governments as shown by the mode of 
the distribution of the variable concerned. Education is not relevant when 
it comes to non-GPS countries, but it is, and positively so, when it comes 
to the GPS uncovering an emulation of tastes and preferences on the part 
of their citizens relative to their more advanced counterparts. Finally, and 
confirming the outcomes of previous literature on developing and non-
mature democracies, there are strong election year budget cycles on the 
GPS. All considered, for the period, the GPS have experienced 
significantly tough pressures upon their public expenditures, furthermore 
revealing behavioral patterns typical of the literature, notwithstanding the 
particular international circumstances they were facing.   
When we add Italy and Ireland to GPS and re-estimate the model, 
the results we get are unmistakably diverse from the previous ones, 
clearly distinguishing between these two structurally different sets of 
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countries. Now, ideology, fragmentation, education, election-year and 
post-election year budget cycles are not statistically different from those  
prevailing in the other seven countries. The only different effects are 
those on union density and the elderly population, both with a restraining 
impact upon the explained fiscal variable, and the GINI coefficient, which 
now points to a perceptible effort towards income redistribution. But, 
contrary to what we would expect from previous work, the estimated 
coefficients also reveal positive post-election year budget effects, but no 
cycles,9 for all countries, including the developed and mature economies 
of the sample. This outcome is understandable if we bear in mind that 
political campaigns are also made of promises concerning increasing 
expenditures to be inscribed in future budgets. And the more elections 
take place towards the end of the year the more difficult it becomes for 
incumbents not to translate those promises in their proposed budgets for 
the following fiscal year. These results are qualitatively confirmed by the 
regression reported on Table 7 where we have excluded GPS and divided 
the remaining sample between Italy and Ireland, on one hand, and the 
other seven developed and democratically mature countries. 
The outcomes on social security transfers on GPS exhibit striking 
differences of regime relative to the rest of the sample (see Table 4). With 
the exception of union density and fragmentation, all other variables have 
significantly different estimated coefficients. The impact of the elderly 
population upon the dependent variable is positive, but unsurprisingly 
                                           
9
 We distinguish between post-election year budget cycles and effects. For 
cycles we mean what the literature has come to expect as corrections for cycles 
undertook in election years, therefore implying estimated negative coefficients for the 
post-election year variable. For effects, we mean the reinforcement in the future of those 
election year cycles, as uncovered by estimated positive coefficients. 
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lower than among non-GPS. Our explanation for this lies on 
comparatively lower pensions and survival rates for retired citizens 
prevailing among GPS countries. Government ideology is a positively 
contributing factor to this type of expenditures, that is, social transfers 
tend to increase as governments’ ideology moves to the left, and vice-
versa, precisely what the theory expects; however, it plays no role among 
non-GPS. Among the latter ideology inspired income redistribution 
behaves as if it had achieved a  stable political equilibrium solution due to 
a consensus on the subject among the political parties involved.10 In what 
concerns education it has a negative influence among non-GPS, but 
positive among GPS. We rationalize the first of the reported results on the 
grounds of the positive association between education and personal 
income. The positive impact of this explanatory variable among GPS 
might be explained on similar grounds: growth on GDP, which is a 
variable highly correlated with education, makes it more feasible to 
increase the level of income redistribution. Indeed, on the part of both 
Greece and Spain there were significant income redistribution efforts 
visible in the decrease of the respective GINI coefficients, which were 
also true for Italy and France but not for Portugal and all the other 
countries in the sample. Furthermore, we observe election year budget 
cycles and post-election year positive effects among the GPS, that is, 
increased social expenditures on election years are reinforced on the 
following year on account of promises made during the electoral 
                                           
10
 It is as if in developed and mature democracies ideological polarization had 
vanished and its place taken by political polarization, that is, non-ideological 
competition among political parties due to a tendency to move towards the center of the 
political spectrum. Historical examples illustrate the point we make in the main text, 
such as, for example: the governments of Mitterrand in France, Blair’s in the U.K., and 
even SPD’s in Germany in coalition with the Greens. 
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campaign.  At least for the Portuguese this is no surprise since they are 
used to the high priority attached by politicians to the vote of senior 
citizens. And, as Schuknecht (2000, p. 118) points out, some expenditure 
increases are difficult to reverse once installed. When we add Ireland and 
Italy, some of the estimated coefficients change significantly, most 
notably those related to political variables: now the role played by 
ideologies is no different from the observed among the seven other 
countries in the sample, and there are no election and post-election year 
budget effects. The analysis of this explained variable is completed when 
we look at Table 7 and see that, indeed, the performance of Italy and 
Ireland is again no different from that of the other seven developed and 
mature democracies except for union density and elderly population. 
Now, with respect to the estimated coefficients on the control variables, 
when we consider the sub-samples, the most important result to retain is 
the positive estimated coefficient on the one period lagged debt; indeed, it 
is as if policies undertook to control debt within its agreed limits 
produced socially negative impacts demanding an increase in social 
expenditures.  
With respect to fiscal revenues as a proportion to GDP (see Table 
5), all variables are significantly different among GPS countries in 
comparison to non-GPS nations, except for post-election year budget 
cycles. A first result deserving to be emphasized is the non-existence of 
election year budget cycles among the developed and mature economies 
in the sample; moreover post-election year cycles, or effects, are absent in 
all cases. Union density and the Gini coefficient exert a stronger 
depressing effect upon GPS’s fiscal revenues relative to the other 
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countries; even though elderly population calls for more fiscal revenues, it 
does so for a value that is roughly half the case in the non-GPS. Besides, 
among the latter education acts negatively upon the dependent fiscal 
variable, the opposite being true for the other sub-sample. Government´s 
ideology is not statistically significant among non-GPS but it is so among 
the GPS. Once more, ideology plays a significant and classical role in 
these other countries: here left-wing ideologies are more committed to 
redistribution through taxation unveiling a strong ideological polarization 
along traditional lines typical of countries with infant democratic regimes. 
Among the GPS fragmentation concurs in the same positive direction 
validating the results already observed with expenditures, that is: coalition 
governments are not necessarily synonymous with political weakness as 
claimed by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b). Lastly, GPS experience 
election year positive taxation cycles; combining this information with the 
one relative to total expenditures we observe that election year 
expenditure cycles are only partially financed through increased taxation, 
and fiscal illusion, an expression of lack of transparency, does indeed 
prevail among voters there. Even though cycles of this type run against 
conventional wisdom they might be explained by three factors: a) under 
normal circumstances, fiscal measures applying in a particular fiscal year 
are inscribed in budgets produced and approved in the previous fiscal year 
which, combined with low levels of transparency, acts to prevent voters to 
be fully aware of it happening; b) populist electoral campaigns directed at 
voters with lower than average incomes; c) the higher share of indirect 
taxation on fiscal revenues. Adding Ireland and Italy to the sub-sample 
brings out some significant qualitative changes, most notably the loss of 
statistical significance by elderly population, government fragmentation 
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and election year budget cycles. Once more, Table 7 unveils that Italy’s 
and Ireland’s performance is not statistically different from the other 
seven developed and mature democracies. 
Let’s now address the variable budget surplus. The results are 
reported in Table 6. Some of the tensions uncovered on GPS either on 
expenditures or on taxes do not show up in the budget surplus, such being 
the cases with ideology, union density, elderly and education whose 
estimated coefficients are not statistically different from non-GPS 
member states. Besides the specific negative impacts upon the budget 
balance arising from legislative fragmentation and the Gini coefficient, by 
far the most remarkable and influential results on the GPS are found on 
the negative and statistically significant estimated coefficients for election 
year cycles and post-election year effects, all of which are absent among 
non-GPS. Hence, not only election year budget cycles do prevail as they 
are reinforced in the following year in a very significant manner, instead 
of being reversed through post-election cycles. That is, there is no budget 
consolidation in the year following elections. This is not an outcome 
difficult to rationalize bearing in mind the promises made during electoral 
campaigns which winning parties feel compelled to implement for the 
sake of their own credibility, coupled with the difficulty to reverse 
expenditures when in the form of entitlements.11 Therefore, budgetary 
problems in these countries show a strong and distinct tendency to worsen 
in a snowball effect. Once more, Table 7 completely differentiates 
between the cases of GPS, on one hand, and Italy’s and Ireland’s on the 
                                           
11
 An example taken for the Portuguese case is the adoption of the so-called 
rendimento mínimo de inserção (minimum social income) introduced in 1996 (Lei n.º 
19-A/96) by the new socialist government led by António Guterres. 
23 
 
other. Finally, on what accounts the control variables, countercyclical 
policies are unveiled in spite of the asymmetrical nature of fiscal policy, 
and a significant effort to control governments’ debt. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The empirical tests just reported unveil strong and illuminating 
facts about GPS’s management of critical fiscal variables. The behavior 
of the institutional, demographic and, most especially, political variables 
is indeed statistically different from the one exhibited by the other 
countries. Government ideology has the typical influence expected by the 
literature along the spectrum from right to left. On the other hand, the 
attainment of higher education levels by a population long repressed by 
previous dictatorships in their ability to copy other countries’ 
consumption patterns has pressed for high government expenditures, in 
opposition to the conservative fiscal preferences exhibited by the more 
developed and mature countries. Besides, and contrary to the point of 
view expressed by Roubini and Sachs (1989 a, b), our results prove that 
legislative fragmentation is  not necessarily synonymous with weak 
governments; indeed, circumstances classifiable as national emergencies 
may lead to the formation of coalitions, and even of caretaker 
governments in order to accomplish such vital national goals. Even 
though some of the tensions subjecting GPS expenditures are 
compensated on the revenue side, as it is the case with the influence 
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played by the governments’ ideology, the same is not true with the role 
played by legislative fragmentation, the GINI coefficient and, most 
importantly, with electoral year budget cycles and post-election year 
effects. These latter effects are strong and cumulative, and quite distinct 
from non-GPS since they are non-existent there. Accordingly, these tests 
confirm some predictions from the economic literature, especially that 
budget cycles are specific to non-mature democracies and developing 
countries. An additional aspect deserving attention lies in the fact that 
election year budget cycles are stronger on the expenditure side than on 
taxation’s. 
In view of the information we are able to obtain by means of these 
tests, it is only reasonable to say that their present crisis was not an 
absolute surprise. Additionally, in spite of their present difficulties, Italy 
and Ireland are undoubtedly in the group of the developed and mature 
democracies, rather than in the GPS group thus lending empirical support 
to the idea that their problems have entirely different causes, thus 
requiring different solutions and time horizons for them to be fruitful.  
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in PPS 
 
 
Left axis: Remaining eleven countries  
Right axis: Luxembourg 
 
Source: Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/printTable.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=te
c00114&printPreview=true 
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Figure 2: General Government Expenditures 
  
a)
 
 
 
b) 
 
The dots represent the average general government expenditures in the period 1976-
2008, and the bars the standard deviation. 
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Figure 3: General Government Tax Revenues 
   
  
a) 
 
 
b)
The dots represent the average general government tax revenues in the period 1976-
2008, and the bars the standard deviation. 
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Figure 4: General Government Social Transfers 
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Figure 5: General Government Surplus 
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 Table 1: GDP per capita in PPS  
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 1995-2010 
Variation 
1995-2010 
Austria 134 134 132 132 132 132 126 127 128 128 125 126 124 124 125 126 128.4 -6.0% 
Belgium 128 126 126 123 123 126 124 125 123 121 120 118 116 116 118 119 122.0 -7.0% 
Finland 107 106 110 114 115 117 115 115 113 116 114 114 118 119 115 115 113.9 7.5% 
France 116 114 114 115 115 115 115 115 111 110 110 108 108 107 108 108 111.8 -6.9% 
Germany 129 127 124 122 121 118 116 114 116 115 116 115 116 116 116 118 118.7 -8.5% 
Greece 84 83 84 83 83 84 86 90 93 94 91 92 90 92 94 90 88.3 7.1% 
Ireland 103 109 116 122 127 132 134 139 142 143 145 146 148 133 128 128 130.9 24.3% 
Italy 121 121 119 120 118 118 118 112 111 107 105 105 104 104 104 101 111.8 -16.5% 
Luxembourg 223 221 215 218 238 245 234 240 248 253 255 270 275 279 266 271 246.9 21.5% 
Netherlands 123 125 127 128 131 134 134 133 129 129 131 131 132 134 132 133 130.4 8.1% 
Portugal 77 77 78 79 81 81 80 80 79 77 79 79 79 78 80 80 79.0 3.9% 
Spain 91 92 93 95 96 97 98 100 101 101 102 105 105 104 103 100 98.9 9.9% 
EU (27 
countries) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/printTable.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&printPreview=true 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Fiscal Dependent Variables 
  A B Fi Fr G Gr Ir It L N P S 
General Government 
Expenditures 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
50.4 
4.5 
4.1% 
52.1 
4.7 
-0.7% 
46.7 
8.8 
23% 
51.3 
2.7 
18.9 
46.1 
2.9 
-9.6 
38.3 
8.0 
75.6% 
43.6 
7.5 
-13.0% 
46.4 
6.3 
27.3% 
39.6 
1.7 
-0.1% 
51.2 
5.2 
-11.4% 
41.1 
4.7 
54.1% 
37.2 
7.0 
50.5% 
General Government Tax 
Revenues 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
39.6 
3.4 
17.5% 
41.3 
4.1 
11.6% 
39.9 
5.2 
6.8% 
40.2 
4.0 
15.8% 
25.3 
1.6 
3.3% 
25.7 
5.2 
48.3% 
31.1 
2.8 
-11.4% 
34.4 
7.0 
64.1% 
34.7 
4.7 
16.2% 
40.3 
3.3 
-7.6% 
26.3 
6.7 
70.3% 
25.8 
7.6 
79.1% 
General Government Social 
Transfers 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
17.3 
2.3 
14.9% 
12.8 
1.9  
0.6% 
13.8 
4.9 
32.4% 
17.0 
1.0 
1.2% 
16.5 
20.1 
-2.9% 
12.7 
3.4 
59.5%  
11.3 
3.1 
-3.3%  
15.2 
1.7 
11.8%  
16.7 
3.6 
-51.0%  
19.3 
6.6 
-124%  
10.5 
3.5 
25.7%  
13.0 
2.9 
10.5  
General Government Surplus 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
-0.2 
1.5 
151.4% 
0.9 
3.9 
169.7% 
2.2 
3.7 
-45.4% 
-0.5 
1.1 
-142% 
-0.2 
1.9 
-207% 
-0.9 
2.8 
711.9% 
-0.2 
4.0 
-109.9 
-1.1 
3.9 
142.1% 
1.0 
2.1 
161.1% 
0.4 
1.9 
404.2% 
-0.6 
2.2 
114.3% 
-1.0 
2.5 
-195.1 
;, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
49.9 
10.6 
-45.9% 
50.9 
4.6 
-0.6% 
67.4 
11.4 
6.9% 
14.3 
5.6 
-62.6% 
30.7 
4.8 
-42.9% 
32.9 
6.0 
-35.8% 
53.8 
9.0 
-44.5% 
39.1 
6.8 
-33.3% 
45.8 
3.2 
-15.3% 
29.5 
6.4 
43.0% 
34.0 
16.9 
70.2% 
16.1 
8.3 
67.6% 
?, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
15.0 
0.8 
14.7% 
14.9 
1.5 
22.9% 
12.6 
2.5 
52.3% 
14.3 
1.4 
22.8% 
15.6 
2.1 
39.5% 
13.9 
2.6 
49.2% 
11.1 
0.2 
0.9% 
14.7 
3.1 
69.2% 
13.4 
0.7 
6.1% 
12.2 
1.5 
36.7% 
13.7 
2.9 
52.6% 
13.0 
2.8 
53.7% , Mode 3 3 3 1 1 5 1 3 3 1 1 5 , Mode 2 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 4 
, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
42.9 
4.2 
13.7% 
35.7 
6.9 
13.2% 
42.9 
5.7 
23.2% 
42.7 
4.5 
-4.9% 
46.5 
4.6 
21.9% 
44.9 
3.6 
-9.9% 
44.4 
3.0 
16.3% 
45.5 
3.7 
-7.0% 
36.5 
4.4 
12.3% 
41.1 
2.3 
7.3% 
53.0 
4.3 
24.1% 
39.8 
4.3 
-19.5% 
, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
31.1 
7.7 
64.2% 
23.9 
7.8 
87.0% 
17.1 
5.7 
5.3% 
19.4 
12.1 
376.9% 
21.9 
15.1 
506.7% 
25.1 
3.0 
87.5% 
25.3 
40.5 
48.0% 
18.8 
8.5 
195.0% 
22.7 
5.7 
80.4% 
28.8 
10.4 
65.6% 
7.7 
3.8 
218.4% 
13.3 
5.9 
178.5% 
:;, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
50.8 
19.4 
152.4& 
100.0 
28.1 
64.0& 
34.5 
20.1 
411.3% 
48.3 
17.1 
158.5% 
43.5 
17.3 
176.4% 
60.9 
40.3 
448.9% 
69.2 
25.9 
-23.7% 
92.9 
28.0 
39.3% 
8.8 
2.7 
203.7% 
70.5 
13.7 
27.5% 
68.3 
4.2 
9.2% 
57.6 
11.0 
-3.5% 
, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
4.2 
0.5 
-5.0% 
7.7 
2.3 
-2.8% 
6.9 
4.0 
42.2% 
9.0 
1.7 
59.2% 
8.3 
1.5 
73.8% 
8.7 
1.7 
10.0% 
10.5 
5.1 
-54.7% 
9.1 
1.5 
-9.5% 
3.0 
1.0 
44.1% 
5.4 
2.0 
69.6% 
6.4 
1.6 
-6.1% 
13.2 
3.2 
90.0% 
, Mean Std Dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
71.7 
15.5 
73.6% 
128.3 
25.0 
59.2% 
57.9 
10.4 
67.2% 
42.6 
8.5 
40.1% 
51.0 
13.7 
111.7% 
44.4 
10.0 
40.7% 
114.0 
33.0 
62.7% 
41.7 
8.0 
36.8% 
201.9 
43.6 
83.1% 
107.3 
16.0 
47.4% 
58.2 
9.39 
82.1% 
37.7 
13.3 
96.8% 
A-Austria; B-Belgium; Fi-Finland; Fr-France; G-Germany; Gr-Greece; Ir-Ireland; It-Italy; L-Luxembourg; N-Netherlands; P-Portugal; S-Spain 
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Table 3: Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Expenditures 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS Countries 
(V) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
 41.64*** 5.30 41.05*** 4.66  28.84*** 3.96  1.30*** 11.31 1.34*** 13.35  1.18*** 11.16 :;) -0.04* -1.82 -0.04* -1.81 :;) -0.03 -1.37  -0.07** -2.48 -0.06** -2.12  -0.07** -2.30  0.14** 2.41 0.10 1.27  0.32*** 5.74  0.69** 2.09 0.90*** 2.65  1.52*** 3.17  -0.23 -1.52 -0.36** -2.39  -0.40** -2.50  -0.87*** -3.50 -1.31*** -3.79  -1.22*** -3.71  -0.22*** -7.00 -0.22*** -6.95  -0.24*** -5.88  -0.02 -0.46 -0.04 -0.78  0.05 1.44  -0.08 -0.21 -0.16 -0.39  0.18 0.52  0.42 1.03 0.37 0.78  0.70** 1.97  ∗    -0.25 -1.09  ∗  -0.36*** -4.85  ∗    -0.13 -0.28  ∗  -1.50*** -4.45  ∗    0.66*** 3.31  ∗  0.46 1.50  ∗    1.22*** 2.84  ∗  0.47 1.28  ∗    -0.17 -1.15  ∗  0.28* 1.68  ∗    0.61** 2.09  ∗  0.14 1.24  ∗    3.17*** 3.29  ∗  -0.70 -0.82  ∗    1.03 1.04  ∗  -0.63 -0.50 
OBS/Countries 230 / 12 230 / 12 230 / 12 
Time/country 
Fixed Effects Yes / Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared 0.87 0.87 0.91 
DW 0.55 0.62 0.60 
F Statistic 29.42 26.38 28.44 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section consistent standard errors 
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Table 4: Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Social Transfers 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS Countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
 6.38 0.89 7.59 1.01  -8.14 -1.65  0.71*** 9.02 0.71*** 12.35  0.76*** 11.09 :;) 0.02 1.59 0.03** 2.46 :;) 0.05*** 3.79  0.01 0.60 0.02 0.76  -0.02 -1.11  -0.14*** -2.96 -0.21*** -3.05  0.24** 2.30  1.23*** 3.63 1.62*** 3.76  1.80*** 3.45  -0.02 -0.27 -0.14 -1.45  -0.07 -0.47  -0.57*** -2.96 -0.72*** -2.62  -0.27 -0.86  -0.13*** -5.01 -0.14*** -5.02  0.02 0.44  -0.13*** -4.12 -0.20*** -5.08  0.02 0.45  -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 -0.34  0.10 0.26  -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.30  0.08 0.23  ∗    -0.18 -1.02  ∗  -0.71*** -8.21  ∗    -1.10** -2.50  ∗  -1.85*** -4.36  ∗    0.55*** 3.65  ∗  0.31 1.27  ∗    0.49 1.41  ∗  -0.02 -0.05  ∗    -0.19** -2.03  ∗  -0.30*** -2.67  ∗    0.63** 2.31  ∗  0.50*** 4.81  ∗    2.01* 1.67  ∗  0.14 0.21  ∗    2.15** 2.17  ∗  0.45 0.59 
OBS/Countries 230 – 12 230 - 12 230 – 12 
Time/country 
Fixed Effects Yes / Yes Yes / Yes Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
0.64 0.65 0.77 
DW 0.25 0.30 0.40 
F Statistic 8.81 8.05 13.89 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section consistent standard errors. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Tax Revenues 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS Countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
 35.21*** 9.85 35.12*** 10.20  33.64*** 9.47  0.29*** 3.60 0.36*** 5.01  0.36*** 4.88 :;) 0.03** 2.37 0.03** 2.30 :;) 0.03** 2.49  -0.03** -2.16 -0.03* -1.82  -0.04** -2.31  -0.03 -0.77 -0.10** -2.26  0.14* 1.94  1.01*** 4.17 1.23*** 4.78  0.20 0.61  -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 -1.44  -0.05 -0.65  -0.16 -1.30 -0.26* -1.62  -0.04 -0.17  -0.10*** -4.01 -0.08*** -3.22  0.002 0.08  -0.16*** -5.88 -0.19*** -6.48  -0.07* -1.76  -0.41 -1.51 -0.42 -1.49  -0.24 -0.87  -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04  0.01 0.04  ∗    -0.33*** -2.75  ∗  -0.15* -1.94  ∗    -0.54* -1.73  ∗  0.36 1.44  ∗    0.55*** 4.60  ∗  0.38** 2.30  ∗    0.49* 1.91  ∗  -0.10 -0.37  ∗    -0.43*** -5.09  ∗  -0.18** -2.14  ∗    0.98*** 5.36  ∗  0.28*** 3.32  ∗    1.99*** 2.79  ∗  -0.27 -0.50  ∗    0.58 0.80  ∗  -0.07 -0.12 
OBS/Countries 230 – 12 230 – 12 230 / 12 
Time/country 
Fixed Effects Yes / Yes Yes / Yes Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared 0.89 0.90 0.91 
DW 0.49 0.60 0.59 
F Statistic 36.34 35.42 38.38 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section consistent standard errors. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Surplus 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS Countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Variables Coefficient t-Statistic 
 6.29 1.18 7.91 1.33  12.52** 2.19  -0.76*** -9.68 -0.76*** -8.29  -0.73*** -7.84 :;) 0.12*** 6.96 0.12*** 6.70 :;) 0.12*** 6.38  0.02 1.21 0.02 0.97  0.03* 1.68  -0.10* -1.71 -0.14** -2.00  -0.21*** -2.65  -0.5 -1.27 -0.27 -0.87  -0.96*** -3.63  0.30*** 2.63 0.28*** 2.77  0.24** 2.07  0.56*** 3.29 0.85*** 3.57  1.06*** 3.07  0.15*** 4.63 0.18*** 6.30  0.17*** 5.18  -0.05 -1.19 -0.08 -1.54  -0.10** -1.89  -0.09 -0.34 -0.01 -0.05  -0.16 -0.62  -0.29 -0.89 -0.14 -0.43  -0.40 -1.49  ∗    0.15 0.77  ∗  0.27** 2.43  ∗    -0.69 -1.09  ∗  0.65* 1.86  ∗    -0.09 -0.39  ∗  0.23 0.76  ∗    -0.55** -2.02  ∗  -0.67* -1.67  ∗    -0.28** -1.98  ∗  -0.14 -0.98  ∗    0.14 0.50  ∗  0.19 1.11  ∗    -1.74*** -2.64  ∗  0.15 0.16  ∗    -2.15*** -3.34  ∗  0.09 0.11 
OBS/Countries 230 – 12 230 - 12 230 - 12 
Time/country 
Fixed Effects Yes / Yes Yes / Yes Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared 
0.64 0.65 0.67 
DW 0.83 0.92 0.91 
F Statistic 8.52 8.02 8.46 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section consistent standard errors. 
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Table 7:  Estimates for Ireland and Italy in the Context of the Nine Developed and 
Mature Democracies Eurozone Founding Countries 
 (I)  Expenditures (II)  Tax Revenues (III) Social Transfers (IV) Surplus 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 22.36*** 2.68 28.80*** 6.74 -12.97* -1.94 10.73* 1.70  1.32*** 12.63 0.41*** 4.95 0.86*** 11.88 -0.82*** -8.30 :;) -0.04 -1.53 0.03** 2.03 0.04*** 3.37 0.12*** 6.44  -0.04 -1.16 -0.02 -0.85 -0.01 -0.53 0.03 1.39  0.19*** 3.05 0.07 0.86 0.18 1.55 -0.14* -1.67  2.21*** 4.13 0.68* 1.84 2.09*** 3.21 -1.07*** -3.28  -0.49*** -2.98 -0.12 -1.48 -0.11 -0.78 0.25** 2.07  -1.15*** -3.56 0.02 0.06 -0.25 -0.80 0.99*** 2.91  -0.28*** -6.47 -0.03 -1.10 0.01 0.21 0.18*** 4.79  -0.01 -0.15 -0.10** -2.14 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -1.26  0.20 0.53 -0.22 -0.76 0.09 0.24 -0.13 -0.49  0.68** 1.98 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.22 -0.37 -1.38  ∗  -0.34** -2.35 -0.12 -0.92 -0.73*** -6.78 0.12 0.62  ∗  -4.00** -2.32 -1.33 -1.21 -2.57* -1.85 1.50 1.03  ∗  0.43 0.57 0.44 1.31 0.33 0.68 0.14 0.30  ∗  -0.06 -0.13 -0.31 -1.17 -0.28 -0.76 -0.39 -0.88  ∗  0.72*** 3.01 0.15 1.02 -0.23 -1.14 0.12 0.67  ∗  0.85 1.20 0.77 1.62 0.68 1.37 -0.24 -0.37  ∗  -0.68 -0.69 0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.12 0.88 0.90  ∗  -0.39 -0.29 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.54 0.73 0.70 
OBS/Countries 204 - 9 204 - 9  204 - 99 204 -9  
Time/country 
Fixed Effects Yes / Yes Yes / Yes Yes / Yes Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared 0.88 0.89 0.77 0.69 
DW 0.74 0.70 0.40 1.03 
F Statistic 27.55 29.65 12.71 8.88 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section consistent standard errors. 
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